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Introduction
The Cold War is fast becoming a distant memory. Even the term “post-Cold War era” is 
now rarely used in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and the launching by President 
Bush of the “Global War on Terror” (GWOT). But for the United States, as the only 
nation-state at present with truly global interests and global reach, it is necessary to be 
consistently vigilant of not only immediate concerns but of those developments over the 
horizon that could pose major difficulties in the future.
Central to American power, obviously, is enormous economic wealth and technological 
dynamism that has facilitated the deployment of extraordinarily capable conventional 
and nuclear forces. A critical partner of this power is the structure of international 
relationships—especially in Europe, East Asia and the Middle East—that have been 
adroitly used by Washington in the furtherance of this power.
But as we move through the first decade of the 21st century, what is beginning to 
emerge is a global situation in which the United States does not face a single adversary 
similar to Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, which dominated American strategic 
thought for half a century. Both of these states had political ideologies deeply 
antithetical to American values. Both states played limited or negligible roles in 
American economic policy. And, in each case, the United States was able to marshal 
important supporters throughout the world in advance of American policy.
But the gathering threats facing the United States in the contemporary era are 
qualitatively different.
Islamic Jihad
This threat is based on a particular interpretation of Islam that has spread to scores of 
countries throughout Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and probably even within 
the Muslim communities of Canada and the United States. The threat is not “state 
based” and indeed the stated goal of its titular leader Usama Bin Laden is to destroy the 
very system of nation-states created in Europe in the 17th century and replace it with a 
new Islamic Caliphate that stretches from North Africa to South East Asia, and 
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eventually covers the world. 
America’s economic, military, and political support for Arab and other Muslim states is 
itself a rationale used by the Jihadists to recruit adherents intended to overthrow the 
very regimes that welcome this support. And militarily, as evidenced in Iraq and 
elsewhere, the Jihadist use of suicide bombers in urban areas and against critical 
infrastructure facilities has largely nullified the classical elements of U.S. military power.
New Nuclear States
From roughly 1960 to 1990, United States' nuclear non-proliferation policy, while far 
from fully successful, focused on dissuading many of its allies—Germany, Italy, South 
Korea, Taiwan—from acquiring nuclear weapons. Pledges to maintain, strengthen, or 
withdraw U.S. security guarantees were instrumental in dissuading these governments 
from pursuing their nuclear programs to weapons deployment. Even when Ukraine 
found itself with a nuclear arsenal after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was the 
fashioning of security, economic, energy and political arrangements that were crucial. 
Later in the 1990s, when both India and Pakistan detonated nuclear devices and 
declared themselves nuclear weapons states, the sense of threat to American interests 
was considered minimal, and both states have since developed much closer strategic 
ties with the United States, although for very different reasons. The current major 
nuclear proliferation cases—North Korea and Iran—represent much deeper concerns. 
The former, if successful, would represent a successful policy by a new nuclear state to 
deter the United States from a successful counter proliferation policy by holding major 
targets like Seoul and Tokyo at risk, a lesson with enormous negative precedential 
value. It could also trigger a chain of new nuclear states which, if it included Japan, 
could fundamentally alter the security system of East Asia for the first time in a half-
century. The second could trigger armed conflict with Israel, stimulate additional 
proliferation in the Middle East, and reduce even further the low probability of bringing 
peace and stability to the region.
China as a Great Power
The United States has never in modern times faced a situation where one of its closest 
trading partners and targets for direct foreign investment is also a strategic rival. With 
the resolution of Taiwan’s status an enduring source of potential Sino-American conflict, 
the intersection of the two states’ complex economic interdependence will have 
substantial and unpredictable impact on their overall relationship, which will be driven in 
both countries by important domestic constituencies.
In this context, the analysis that follows addresses the following questions:
1.  How has U.S. security strategy affected nuclear relations among the major 
powers over the last decade? 
2.  Is Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) among great powers, and especially in 
Sino-American relations, a relevant concept today? 
3.  What do the Bush Administration’s new national defense and military strategies 
mean for U.S.-PRC relations? 
4.  How is the United States' strategic approach toward China likely to evolve in the 
coming years? 
I. How Has U.S. Security Strategy Affected Nuclear Relations among 
the Major Powers over the Last Decade?
In the past ten years, the United States' security strategy has endured a dramatic 
transformation. When Bill Clinton entered the White House in 1993, running on a 
political platform of “it’s the economy, stupid,” he and his senior advisors embraced the 
notion that, with the end of the Cold War, the era would be dominated by domestic and 
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international economic concerns. Then U.S. Ambassador to the UN articulated an 
approach of “assertive multilateralism,” which collapsed after the fiasco in Somalia 
when 18 U.S. combatants were killed after the United States could not obtain UN 
approval to protect them. 
The highest priorities for the Administration were to assist in the democratization of 
Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union; to encourage economic, political 
and military engagement with China, in part to promote pluralism and democratic 
interests in Chinese domestic politics; and to complete the de-nuclearization of Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Clinton turned out to be an activist and selective military 
interventionist as President, but with no seeming overall strategy. Besides Somalia, U.
S. forces were sent to Bosnia and Kosovo in the Balkans as well as to Haiti. There was 
a tense showdown with North Korea over its nuclear program until the Agreed 
Framework was reached in 1994, and a crisis in Sino-American relations over Taiwan 
not long thereafter. 
On the nuclear front, Clinton moved cautiously but unsuccessfully to win U.S. Senate 
ratification of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. He chose to implement a “stockpile 
stewardship” program to keep the United States' nuclear deterrent reliable and credible 
without further testing or new weapons development. He sought to renegotiate the ABM 
Treaty with the Russian Federation—never completed—to permit deployment of theater 
missile defenses so that U.S. forces and allies could be protected against regional 
nuclear threats, notably Japan in the face of North Korea’s projected capability. And he 
failed to respond militarily, with the exception of a very selective strike in Afghanistan 
and Sudan, to a series of terrorist attacks including the first World Trade Center 
bombing in 1993, the Khobar Towers attack of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia in 1996, the 
devastation of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar as Salaam in 1998, and the attack 
on the USS Cole in 2000. 
Perhaps this smorgasbord of national security activities reflected both a time in which 
there was no perceived existential or even significant long-term threat and also the 
President’s and his senior advisors’ eclectic approach to foreign policy. At the end of the 
Clinton years, it was difficult to offer a succinct definition of what constituted U.S. 
security strategy.
This selective, cautious, and somewhat vague approach to security policy was radically 
transformed by the Bush administration—especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
President Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 
and members of the National Security Council staff were of the view that U.S. security 
policy had to have clarity, consistency, and an articulate commitment to a no-nonsense 
approach to the protection of U.S. national interests. When the Administration entered 
office, there is little doubt that the intent was to return to a focus on the major powers, 
as had been stated in Foreign Affairs articles by Condoleeza Rice and Robert Zoelick 
before the election.
In particular, there was a high priority placed on the United States' withdrawal from the 
ABM Treaty in order to facilitate a more rapid deployment of theater and national missile 
defenses that were seen as necessary to combat the growing missile threat from China 
and “rogue states” such as North Korea and Iran. There was also a clear emphasis on 
seeing China as much more of a strategic competitor than a strategic ally. And there 
was a commitment not to engage in the sort of “nation building” in developing countries 
which Clinton had conducted since this was seen as an unnecessary distraction and 
diversion of resources from more central issues. More broadly, it is probably safe to say 
that the Bush team had an “ABC”—anything but Clinton—approach to foreign policy 
and to policy generally. A clear break from the past across the board was the intent of 
the new team.
The terrorist attacks on 9/11 altered a number of these going-in approaches and 
accelerated others. The Bush administration over the course of the next three years 
issued a set of important documents outlining its overall strategic approach including 
statements on national security strategy, counter proliferation of weapons of mass 
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destruction, and homeland security. The emphasis in language and in follow-up action 
was now-on:
l     Preemptive use of force against terrorist threats and those who support them, 
which leapt to the forefront as the nation’s leading national security priority. 
“Those who support them” was a key rationale for the actions to topple the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, leading to 
far more elaborate “nation building” efforts than had ever been initially 
envisioned. 
l     Reiteration of the intent to withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in order to move 
rapidly toward deployment of theater and national missile defense, in light of a 
missile threat that had been defined by the Rumsfeld Commission in 1998 as far 
more serious than the one characterized by the Intelligence Community Staff’s 
National Intelligence Estimate. This was completed with the United States' 
withdrawal from the Treaty and the signing of the Moscow Treaty in June 2002 
that called for a reduction in deployed strategic nuclear forces by the United 
States and the Russian Federation, but with limited details and no verification 
procedures. 
l     Use of allies when feasible, but strong indications of a willingness to act alone if 
the situation was warranted. Over time, this became known as an emphasis on 
“unilateralism,” whether fully accurate or not. 
l     Establishment of aggressive counter proliferation policies to remove weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) from the hands of those who might use them against 
the United States. A Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) that led to the formation 
of a group of more than two dozen nations cooperating to interdict items directly 
related to WMD capabilities—including interdiction on the high seas in 
international waters. This emphasis on counter proliferation was a clear shift 
away from more passive acts of “non-proliferation” relying on diplomacy and 
international law. 
l     Opening up the possibilities of developing new nuclear weapons that would be 
specifically designed to target deeply buried, hardened, underground targets, 
and that would have low yields and inflict very limited collateral damage. 
How have these security initiatives affected nuclear relations among the major powers? 
Consider the views of each state in turn:
Russia
Russia has found itself with limited capacity to influence major international events 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991. It had no ability to limit the 
expansion of U.S. military and political influence in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, to 
lead the UN-supported coalition against Iraq in 1991 or the subsequent effort to oust 
Saddam Hussein in 2003. Being itself a target of irredentist Chechen forces that often 
targeted innocent civilians, Moscow was sympathetic to a number of Bush’s GWOT 
initiatives, and permitted the deployment of U.S. forces in different Central Asian states 
to facilitate the United States' invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.
But at the same time Mr. Putin and the Russian leadership is not interested in being the 
lap dog for U.S. policies, and sees many of these policies as against Russian national 
interest. There remains concern throughout important elements of the military high 
command that see the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and the emphasis on missile 
defense as a direct threat to the credibility of the Russian nuclear deterrent. Increased 
budgetary support for follow-on offensive missile systems, including those with 
maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs), has been the response.
Russia’s response on non- and counter-proliferation remains inconsistent. While one 
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would think it was in the Russian national interest to stop or roll back the spread of 
nuclear weapons, in part because of possible linkages to the Chechen problem, Russia 
has been highly enthusiastic, evidently for economic reasons, to support many 
elements of a sophisticated Iranian nuclear energy program that clearly has links to 
weapons development. Russia also remains a recalcitrant partner in the Nunn-Lugar-
Dominici Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, reluctant to share information and 
moving far more slowly in the securing of nuclear materials at U.S. expense than the 
Clinton or Bush team expected.
Geostrategically, Moscow interprets a number of American moves in Ukraine and 
Central Asia coupled with the continued expansion of NATO right to the Russian 
Federation border as a direct threat to their vital interests and an emphasis by 
Washington to create a permanent ring of states dedicated to containing Russian 
expansionism.
China
China for some time has seen the United States as both a vital part in the engine of its 
economic growth and simultaneously its main strategic competitor that alone stands in 
the way of Beijing’s rise to great power status and reclaiming Taiwan. No wonder that 
recent accounts see the Chinese elite as divided into two camps: the economic 
modernists and the security hawks.[1]
The modernists see China joining the United States as the second great economic 
power of the 21st century, and the two nations sharing the gains from increased trade 
ties and global growth. The hawks regard that view as naïve, and fret that American 
policy is to remain the world’s only superpower and to curb China’s rise. So China’s 
response, the hawks say, is to try to erode United States hegemony and reduce 
America’s power to hold China down.[2]
While China also has an Islamic irredentist movement in its western-most province to 
deal with, many strategists in Beijing see U.S. counterterrorism policy as consistent with 
Washington’s desire to contain China. The deployment of U.S. forces in Central Asia, 
including Afghanistan; closer ties with India; urging Japan to take a greater role in their 
use of military force, including participation in contingencies to protect Taiwan; 
continued U.S. sales to Taiwan of sophisticated weapons; and, of course, movement to 
deploy missile defenses in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, are all seen as anti-
Chinese policies. This no doubt has helped stimulate the growth and development of 
more advanced Chinese nuclear forces and the deployment of more intercontinental-
range missile systems capable of striking U.S. territory.
Britain, France, Germany, and Japan
Britain, France, Germany, and Japan have all been largely supportive of U.S. 
counterterrorism policies, including military action in Afghanistan. They split bitterly, 
however, over going to war in Iraq. Britain—really Prime Minister Tony Blair—sided 
enthusiastically with the United States, and committed about 8,000 combat forces and 
Japan also supported the initiative and sent non-combatants. France and Germany 
were openly opposed. Indeed, France used its diplomatic leverage to persuade a wide 
range of countries not to support the United States' proposal to use military force in Iraq 
until WMD inspections were much further along. Nor has either France or Germany 
been willing to help in Iraq after the conventional conflict turned into a highly volatile 
insurgency. 
There has been little relationship, however, between these debates and nuclear 
weapons policies in these countries. Britain and France retain, from the Cold War, what 
was termed “minimum deterrence” capabilities, although against who is not entirely 
clear. Modernization efforts continue but in no way alter the fundamental character of 
these systems. Germany, on the other, seems firmly committed to its non-proliferation 
policy with no signs at all of any alteration for years to come.
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India, Pakistan, and Israel
India, Pakistan, and Israel, the other three nuclear weapons states, have had their 
nuclear programs affected in subtle ways. India, seeking to become a global power in 
all fields, is using its nuclear capability as an argument for permanent status on the UN 
Security Council. It has growing economic, political, and military ties with the United 
States—a vast change from the Cold War era when it was assiduously neutral in 
declaratory policy, but often sided with the Soviet Union, which was its principal arms 
supplier and trading partner. 
Pakistan, on the frontlines in the war on terror, is an ally of the United States—yet it 
harbors terrorists and many virulent anti-American Islamic groups. The United States 
has sought to provide assistance to better secure Pakistan’s nuclear forces, but there is 
limited public information about what, if anything, has actually been provided. The 
revealing of the AQ Khan nuclear proliferation network has cast a shadow on Pakistan-
U.S. relations, but has not necessarily affected the pace of Pakistan’s own nuclear 
development program. The United States intervened diplomatically at very high levels in 
the summer of 2003 when it appeared that an Indo-Pakistani war seemed likely. Since 
then, their bilateral relations have improved markedly. Both sides continue to maintain 
and modernize their nuclear capabilities with India deploying the larger force but 
perhaps Pakistan the more militarily capable. 
Israel, the only non-declared nuclear state widely thought to have nuclear weapons, 
says virtually nothing about its programs. A major stimulus to Israeli concerns is the 
growing Iranian capability, both in terms of longer range delivery systems and advances 
toward nuclear weapons deployment
II. Is Mutual Assured Destruction among Great Powers, and 
Especially in Sino-American Relations, a Relevant Concept Today?
It is not crystal clear how relevant mutual assured destruction (MAD) was during the 
Cold War, but it seems less relevant now, particularly with regard to Sino-American 
relations.
Note that it was U.S. Defense Secretary McNamara who, in the mid-1960s, coined the 
term “assured destruction” as a way to establish criteria for sizing the United States' 
nuclear forces. If a substantial portion of Soviet military and urban-industrial targets 
could be held at risk, even after a Soviet first strike, McNamara reasoned that this 
assured destruction capability would serve as a credible deterrent assuming a ration 
Soviet leadership. The Soviets never publicly endorsed such a concept. And U.S. 
operational planners, less concerned with “declaratory policy” (what we say) than with 
“employment policy” (what we do) always planned to fight a nuclear war in which the 
United States would prevail—whether this was really realistic or not. In short, it may well 
be that the most senior U.S. and perhaps Soviet decision-makers were deterred from 
acting because of assured destruction, but the systems below them were probably 
ready to fight to win if called upon to do so.
The situation in Sino-American relations today is quite different. Obviously there is a 
huge disparity in nuclear firepower, both quantitatively and qualitatively, favoring the 
United States. But this is beside the point. China has no interest in matching U.S. 
nuclear forces. It does have an interest in deterring the United States from intervening 
with conventional forces in case of armed conflict over Taiwan or in some other 
contingency in the future. To accomplish this goal, Chinese strategists have sought to 
expand the number and range of nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles that could reach the 
United States.
A recent Chinese statement on this matter illustrates this situation. On July 15, 2005, 
Major General Zhu Chenghu stated that:
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If the Americans are determined to interfere [in a conflict to defend 
Taiwan] we will be determined to respond. We Chinese will prepare 
ourselves for the destruction of all cities east of Xian. Of course, the 
Americans will have to be prepared that hundreds …of cities will be 
destroyed by the Chinese…War logic dictates that a weaker power needs 
to use maximum efforts to defeat a stronger rival…We have no capability 
to fight a conventional war against the United States…We can’t win this 
kind of war.”[3]
This was not the first time a senior Chinese military officer raised the prospect of 
Chinese use of nuclear weapons in a Taiwan conflict situation. In 1995, during the Sino-
American crisis over Taiwan during the Clinton years, General Xiong Guangkai, now 
deputy chief of the general staff of the People’s Liberation Army, told Chas Freeman, a 
former senior Pentagon official and U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, that China would 
consider using nuclear weapons in a Taiwan conflict. Mr. Freeman quoted Mr. Xiong as 
stating that Americans should worry more about Los Angeles than Taipei.
General Zhu’s statement raises many interesting questions. Is it a departure from 
China’s no first use of nuclear weapons policy, since he was referring to Chinese first 
use after the United States intervened with conventional forces in the Taiwan conflict? 
Would the Chinese leadership really be willing to sacrifice all cities east of Xian if that 
meant wiping out its entire modern economic base? Do the Chinese have enough 
deliverable warheads to actually destroy “hundreds” of U.S. cities when U.S. estimates, 
perhaps incorrectly, place the current capability in the range of 45-57 missiles that can 
reach U.S. targets? Is General Zhu telling us that the DF-31, the DF-3lA road mobile, 
and the Jl-2 submarine launched ballistic missile are much further along than we think 
they are, or are there other new Chinese systems deployed or about to be deployed of 
which we are unaware?
Hence it is the credibility of the Chinese nuclear force to deter U.S. conventional 
intervention in a conflict over Taiwan that is central to Sino-American relations, not 
some abstract and somewhat misleading notion of mutual assured destruction.
III. What do the Bush Administration’s New National Defense and 
Military Strategies Mean for U.S.-PRC Relations?
At a recent meeting in Singapore of Asian defense ministers sponsored by the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld gave a hard 
hitting speech on China and wondered aloud why China was devoting so many 
resources to building up its military capability when no country threatened China. He 
implied that China was perhaps harboring aggressive intent and that Asian nations as 
well as the United States needed to take notice.
But a somewhat different interpretation is worthy of discussion. China, given its size, 
population, history, and newly found economic strength, as well as its enormous 
economic potential, has every right to plan and dream to become a major world power. 
Major world powers have strong military capabilities. Enhancing such capabilities “goes 
with the territory,” without necessarily harboring any aggressive designs. This could be 
one, albeit benign, explanation for the modernization of the Chinese military.
A second interpretation is that the Chinese leadership, perhaps all future Chinese 
leaderships, will seek to resolve the Taiwan question. Having a military option is central 
to their planning. Since it is largely the threat of U.S. military intervention to defend 
Taiwan that has precluded China from taking action for five decades, China is in a 
continuous search to find ways to nullify this threat. Use of a Chinese nuclear deterrent 
to dissuade U.S. conventional force intervention is a plausible response.
A third interpretation is that, partly due to Bush policies, Chinese leaders in Beijing see 
many new threats on the horizon: a reinvigorated Japan that might acquire its own 
nuclear forces or seek to acquire new power projection forces; a U.S.-North Korean 
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conflict that threatens Chinese national interests; down the road a unified Korea armed 
with nuclear weapons; Taiwan with nuclear weapons; a much stronger India with 
advanced nuclear weapons; and a resurgent Russia that again seeks to dominate 
border areas of the Far East.
Bush administration policies almost certainly strengthen the hands of the strategic 
hawks in China who see a U.S. “envelopment” strategy and claim that much greater 
Chinese military as well as economic power is needed to counter American policies. 
Indeed, the seemingly messianic approach of the President in support of the spread of 
democracy poses a direct rhetorical threat to the Chinese leadership that is still highly 
authoritarian even if it is no longer totalitarian.
On the other hand, there are a number of positive contributions of the Bush policies to U.
S.-PRC relations. China is playing a useful if limited role in the war against Islamic 
Jihad, which directly serves China’s own interests. China has been consistently 
encouraged by President Bush to play a constructive mediating role with North Korea, 
and will now host the Six Party talks involving North and South Korea, the United 
States, Russia, and Japan. As the primary external source of food and fuel for North 
Korea, China is considered to have leverage over Pyongyang decision-making and has 
been encouraged to play a constructive role that could resolve the crisis over the North 
Korean nuclear program. And, after much pressure from Washington, China claims to 
be a constructive partner in stopping the spread of WMD, especially nuclear weapons 
and missile technology. This would be an important step forward after China played 
such a critical role in the development of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile technologies.
IV. How is the United States' Strategic Approach Toward China 
Likely to Evolve in the Coming Years?
Since the start of the George H.W. Bush administration, the United States has had a 
two-pronged approach to China: to foster trade, direct foreign investment, and greater 
societal interactions in the hope that a more economically prosperous China would 
become more politically pluralistic; and, to simultaneously remain steadfast that the 
Taiwan issue had to be resolved peacefully, and that the United States would provide 
military support to Taiwan to defend itself.
The United States has also seen its commitment to Taiwan as part of the credibility it 
needs to demonstrate to keep the East Asian security system led by Japan and South 
Korea in a stable condition.
The economic relationship is now of huge significance to both countries. But as 
columnist Tom Friedman has pointed out, it is highly asymmetric. China not only 
provides us with our basic household goods; it also finances our debt. The U.S. 
economic connection, on the other hand, has permitted China to grow at 9% or more 
per year for several years, which it needs to do to provide jobs for all the new entrants 
to the labor force annually.[4]
Absent this level of economic growth, unemployment could lead to huge political unrest, 
and regime change cannot be ruled out.
It seems difficult to visualize a major U.S. departure from this dual approach, unless 
matters spin out of control in North Korea or Taiwan (through Taiwanese policies), 
leading to a Sino-American confrontation. Then all bets are off regarding the bilateral 
economic relationship, no matter how much it will hurt the United States' economy
This seems unlikely, though it is far from unimaginable.
It is best to think of U.S.-PRC relations as a struggle between centripetal forces pulling 
us together and centrifugal forces pulling us apart. In the former category are economic 
interests and the domestic groups that benefit from them, and, to a much less 
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significant extent similar views on countering Islamic terrorism and some common 
interests on the North Korean question. (A divided Korea reduces the likelihood of a 
Japanese military resurgence that would pose a major challenge to China). In the latter 
category is the classical rivalry of a great power and a rising power, as well as specific 
differences over democracy and human rights, intellectual property rights, and, of 
course, Taiwan security.
For a long time the centripetal forces have dominated the centrifugal forces, and the 
peoples of both countries have prospered as a result. A reversal of this condition could 
pose a grave threat to both China and the United States.
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